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Abstract 
The studies regarding the deal amount paid in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) become es-
pecially important, as reduction of profits in such deals might be due to large amounts paid in acqui-
sitions. The methodology of this study is novel as it takes into account the external governance me-
chanism by considering both the institutional ownership and external block-holders along with bid-
der and targeted firm characteristics on deal prices involved in M&As in case of Pakistan during pe-
riod of 2005-12. The results of study show the existence of external monitoring in form of institu-
tional ownership in both sectors. The study proves that the aim of acquisitions is to achieve a big 
size instead of value maximization and the managers who exaggerated their confidence attempt to 
overemphasize their capability to handle the target company, which leads to high amounts paid to 
acquire target. The nonfinancial sector proves the absence of agency conflicts, however agency hy-
pothesis is not proved significant in financial sector case. The financial sector result shows that cash 
financed deals are associated with lower price that depends on presence of asymmetric information 
about acquiring firm, as management (i.e. managers of firm) possess more information as compared 
to other stakeholders. 
Keywords: Mergers & Acquisitions, Asymmetric Information, Governance Mechanism, 
Agency Conflict, Value Maximization 
 
Introduction 
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) characterize different initiatives by management of firms 
with quantifiable values to measure firms performance. A massive literature on consequent perfor-
mance of M&As show that most of deals lead towards unsatisfactory post M&As performance. So, 
M&As are generally observed in frame of agency cost conflict (Shleifer & Vishny (1997); Erickson 
& Wang (1999)). For example, managers may pursue acquisition deals to diversify their unemploy-
ment risk (i.e. by leveling firm's profits), and not necessarily for shareholders' interests. On the other 
hand, these deals may be done to achieve big size. It would permit management to take incentives 
like increased recompense and prestige in post M&As era. However, in case of concentrated bidder's 
structure of ownership, the key M&As associated interest conflict among management and stock-
holders is exchanged with concerns on how majority shareholders expropriate small shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 2002). 
Despite in the increase of a number of these M&As, revenues from these deals are still puz-
zling. On one side, studies conducted to examine bidder and target firm's abnormal profits have re-
vealed varied results. Most of these studies reveal increasing abnormal profits for target and decreas-
ing profits and insignificant results in case of bidder firm. On other side, studies examining the im-
pact of M&As on efficiency and profitability of firms also proved indecisive. A number of studies 
discover that banks buying credit institutes surge their efficacy or market-to-book-value (Akhavein, 
Berger & Humphrey, (1997); Cyree, Wansley & Black, (2000)). 
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Inside this framework, studies relate with amounts paid in M&As deals turn out to be spe-
cially important, as the decrease of returns in these deals might be owed to high prices paid, which 
can set the creditworthiness and constancy of the firm at risk. Indeed, 75 percent of hostile buyouts 
approved from 1985 not be successful because of high prices involved. It will lead to the fact that 
these deals declined from around 22 percent to fewer than 10 percent of total buyouts from 1987 to 
1998 (Cuervo, 1999). 
In Pakistan, the studies related to M&As have generally emphasized the financial segment 
and analyzed pre and post acquisitions performance. Afza & Yusuf (2011) analyzed the efficiency 
gains in banking sector mergers by using stochastic frontier approach and concluded that efficiency 
gains increased after M&A, however that efficiency gain is negligible in cost. Afza and Nazir (2012) 
also investigate the association between corporate governance variables and changes in operating 
performance in bidder firm related with M&A in Pakistan. According to existing literature, not any 
evidence of study is found that examined the influence of acquirer and target firm's features on deal 
amounts in Pakistan. Therefore, the current study is an effort to cover this research gap in corporate 
sector M&As in Pakistan. 
The current study adds to literature in different ways, it consider the joint association be-
tween ownership structure, financial constraints, growth prospects, asymmetric information and the 
choice of financing mode in corporate sector mergers and acquisition. The study also used most 
available latest set of data and an extended model. Most of previous studies examine the impact of 
managerial ownership on deal prices but this study investigates the impact of acquirer firm's institu-
tional ownership on deal prices to check whether they are playing active role in firm’s management. 
Independent outside block-holders, especially, influence the upper management in corporate deci-
sions and may threat to cast their vote to replace management in order to line up the manager's inter-
est with the shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Barclay & Holderness (1991)). The study also 
contributes to existing literature in the sense that it not only focuses the nonfinancial sector but also 
consider the financial sector, and separate analysis is done for both. 
The study used the data set including events of M&As for a period of 2005-12. The bidder 
companies are listed public companies of the Pakistan and target entities includes both the registered 
and non-registered firms. The results regarding deal price determinants in both financial and nonfi-
nancial segment shows that most of target and acquirer firm characteristics are proved to be signifi-
cant as deal price determinants. The results show a significant inverse relation between existence of 
institutional owners and M&As prices. However, the relation between the outside block-holder and 
deal prices is not proved to be significant.  
The rest of study is organized as follows. The second section deals with review of literature. 
Third section deals with the explanation of dependent and explanatory variables used in study. 
Fourth section deals with model development and research methodology. Section five focuses on 
study results and discussion and last section includes conclusion, limitation of study and identifica-
tion of future research areas. 
 
Literature Review 
Previous academic research directed to analyze abnormal return of acquirer and target firm 
in M&As deals have showed mixed results. Numerous previous researches related with M&As have 
showed positive returns for target and negative or insignificant findings for acquirer firm. On the 
other hand, literature analyzing the profitability and efficiency impact of acquisition deals of con-
cerning entities have verified indecisive too.  
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Shawky, Kilb & Staas (1996) examine the mergers premium involved in 320 bank acquisi-
tion deals sample done during a period of 1982-90. The results of study indicate that huge amounts 
are paid to acquire small firms, highly profitable firms, target with high leverage ratios, target in a 
different area than acquirer and transaction conducted through stock payments in place of cash pay-
ments. 
A number of hypotheses are tested in this study, the following section deals with literature 
review and hypothesis development. 
External Monitoring Hypothesis 
Majority shareholders achieve their personal goals and expropriate minority shareholders 
through investing firm's resources particularly in case of weak investor protection or in case of ex-
ceeding voting rights against cash flow rights (Claessens et al. (2002); Cronqvist & Nilsson (2003)). 
Majority shareholders are capable to make corporate decisions like merger & acquisitions without 
substantial resistance from minorities. Majority shareholders are, therefore, expected to pay extra for 
acquisition deals that fulfill their personal goals.  
Jensen (1991) states that active outside stockholders have incentives to carry out costly ex-
ternal monitoring and are useful for firms. Institutional investors and Blockholders are examples of 
potential active stockholders. According to Black (1992) institutional shareholders perform roles 
that are helpful to align management interests with those of shareholders. For example, outside 
blockholders and institutional shareholders are capable of assisting antitakeover movements, endors-
ing an appropriate managerial compensation system, reinforcing institution's view in board meetings 
and possibly assisting the board. Moreover, various institutional shareholders have direct connec-
tions with company's top management and therefore can influence the corporate deal's terms and 
conditions. For now, empirical evidence reveals that deals financed through stock generally reduce 
the acquirer firm’s wealth, so in presence of active outside and institutional blockholders, the likeli-
hood of stock financed acquisition deals would be little.  
Though, managerial or inside shareholders are not only once with control motivations, out-
side blockholders relatively have also a large stake in firm’s stock which motivate them to play ac-
tive role in firm's affairs. However, active contribution of outside shareholders in firm's management 
and their monitoring role is limited as they don’t have a longterm presence in firms. Tufano (1996) 
states that institutional investors (1) are diversified as they have substantial ownership in different 
firms (2) they don't play an active monitoring role in management of firms (3) they have same in-
centive arrangements as atomistic. 
So, it is concluded that outside and institutional blockholders’ control motivation may not be 
enough to play an effective role incorporate decisions of acquirer firm. Also, institutions are not go-
ing against management proposals of their corporate clients, because of business associations be-
tween institutional stockholders and corporate clients (Tufano, 1996).The empirical literature sup-
ports mixed results regarding the role of institutional shareholders and external blockholders in 
firm's strategic decisions, so the following hypothesis is developed. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant relationship between bidder firm's institutional owner-
ship and deal prices, cetris paribus. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant relationship between bidder firm's blockholders own-
ership and deal prices, cetris paribus. 
 
Hubris Hypothesis  
The prices paid in acquisition deals are also affected by acquirer's hubris or agency conflicts. 
Introduced by Roll (1986), the hubris hypothesis means that managers that overstate self-possession 
and overemphasize their capacity to manage target firm, leads them to pay huge prices for targets. 
  
Special Issue on Advancement of Business and Management  Science 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                     55 
 
Previous studies regarding deal premium determinants in acquisition deals shows that well 
managed acquirers are more likely to develop the management of target firm, so these firms are 
most likely to pay large amounts to acquire target firms in order to achieve a high value for firms 
engaged in acquisition deal. Since the management quality is not directly observed, certain proxies 
like profitability and growth of firms are used to test it. The findings of these studies showed the 
significance of the following acquirer's characteristics like return on assets (ROA) and growth of 
main deposits, as determinants of deal premiums (Cheng, Gup & Wall, 1989; Hakes, Brown & Rap-
paport, 1997). According to Moeller et al. (2004) large acquirer firms relatively pay huge amounts 
than small acquirers since larger firm's managers are most likely to be inclined towards hubris.  
The return on assets (ROA) ratio is used as a proxy to test hubris hypothesis. Based on litera-
ture following hypothesis is developed. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant positive relationship between profitability of acquirer 
firm and deal prices. 
Agency Hypothesis 
Consistent with Jensen (1986), agency conflicts may also affect the acquisition deal prices. 
These types of conflicts arise when acquirer firm's management use their free cash flow to accept 
projects that produce insufficient profits for stockholders. Gondhalekar, Sant & Ferris (2004) con-
tend that one consequence of agency conflict is that acquirers categorized by big free cash flows and 
a low market-to-book ratio will use more hostile acquisition tactics and pay huge amounts. By using 
linear regressions, they examine the impact of acquirer's investment opportunities and free cash 
flows separately on deal premiums. The findings show that cash flows directly affect prices, which 
leads to the notion that management decisions aid their personal interests occasionally. More, the 
bidder's investment prospects are negatively related with deal premiums. 
On basis of previous literature, the following hypothesis is developed. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant positive relationship between cash ratio of acquirer 
firm and deal prices. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant negative relationship between acquirer firm's invest-
ment opportunities and deal prices. 
Value Maximization/ Achievement of Big Size Hypothesis 
There are two factors related to M&A deals that explain the attractiveness of target firm for 
bidder. First, payment of high prices to acquire target proposes that target firm value is greater for 
bidding institution than its original shareholders. This augmented value can be described through the 
likelihood that bidder increases the profitability of target either by economies of scale or through 
improved management quality. Secondly, bidder firm goal may be different from maximization of 
value of firm. In this instance, the objective of managers is to increase the institution size in order to 
attain personal incentives. This objective does not lead to value maximization, but to achieve direc-
tors’ personal interests (Berger, Demsetz & Strahan, 1999). 
One objective of the acquisition is to increase the size of institution. This objective, termed 
“too big to fail” is one of the motives of key banking sector mergers in 1990s, in Anglo Saxon litera-
ture, and it defends the payment of high prices for mega mergers and mergers between comparable 
firms. The desire to grow aggressively intended that more profitable and larger institutes are willing 
to pay huge amounts in M&A deals (Hakes, Brown & Rappaport, 1997; Kane, 2000). 
Diaz & Azofra (2009) examine the determinants of premium paid in 81 financial sector 
M&As in European countries during period of 1994-2000. The acquirer firm characteristic that may 
affect premium in merger and acquisition deals comprises the payment potential and ability to im-
prove the management of target firm that are significant only in a subsample of cooperative and sav-
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ing banks and not in complete sample. The target firm features that make it attractive to a bidder in-
clude its % of stock, loans % or its return on equity. A huge product or geographical diversification 
that is achieved by M&As has been not considered by the bidding firms as a cause to defend the 
higher premium payments. Moreover, in a whole sample of merger deals, the findings of study state 
no evidence that shows mergers are done for achievement of management's personal interests. How-
ever, in a subsample of banks, the findings of study reveals that management involved in M&A 
transactions chase their personal interests. 
Dionne, Haye & Bergeres (2010) analyze the information asymmetry influence on premium 
paid in acquisition deals. The findings of study show that informed acquirers, defined as firms hav-
ing at least 5 percent of target firm's shares before the declaration of deal, pay less premiums as 
compared to acquirers without any important information. The uninformed bidding firms suffered 
from winner's curse i.e. either don't join in auction or withdraw earlier from it or win by paying large 
amounts. The findings also reveal that run up in target share price, trigger by rumors after acquisi-
tions declaration, and cause the target firm revaluation by acquirers. Bidders are also prepared to pay 
large amounts for low performing targets because of the probability of high returns associated with 
these target firms. The target firm's size and its relative size are inversely related with premiums, 
which supports the integration cost theory that states acquirers prefer small target firms due to their 
less absorption costs. Also the bidder firms usually pay more to buy target in hostile takeover or 
public purchase offer.  
Alexandridis et al. (2013) analyze empirically the relationship between deal size and pre-
mium payment in a sample of 3691 US public M&A deals declared during 1990-2007. The findings 
of study show that acquirer of big target firms significantly pay low premiums. The findings also 
show that investors perceive big deals as more uncertain because these deals ends in a more severe 
destruction of wealth for acquirers beside with sharp rise in uncertainty of acquirer return around the 
declaration of deals. The bidder firms acquiring big targets carry on to lose their value in long-term 
as compared to acquirer of small targets that create positive abnormal returns for their stockholders. 
The results of study are not in line with expected estimates that relate the big deals failure to risk of 
overpayment.  Instead, it indicates that the intricacy of large deals make economic benefits doubtful 
in spite of evidence regarding the relation of M&A deals with low amounts. 
Based on previous empirical literature, the relation between bidder size and target relative 
size with deal premium is mixed. The study uses size of bidder and relative size of target firm as a 
measure behind mergers motivation and develops following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant relationship between size of acquirer firm and deal 
prices. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant relationship between relative size of target and deal 
prices. 
Financial Synergies and Overvaluation Hypothesis 
Though, in spite of the ability of bidder to pay has not proved to be significant occasionally 
for premium determination, the payment means (cash or stock) has proved particularly significant 
conferring to two reasons: overvaluation hypothesis and financial synergies. Firstly, the relation be-
tween the payment form and premium can be described according to overvaluation hypothesis of 
Myers and Majluf (1984). This hypothesis depends on the presence of information asymmetry about 
the firm, as management of firm have more information than the rest of parties. Executives of bid-
ding institute will prefer stock financed deals if they think their stock to be overvalued. Since the 
stock financed deals would be taken as a negative signal by market, which aware about asymmetric 
information, therefore the value of bidder' shares would decline. So the premium in stock financed 
deals should be higher than cash financed deals. Second, According to financial synergy hypothesis, 
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stock financed deals can offer greater financial synergies than cash financed deals, as the later indi-
cates liquidity constraints. In this logic, prices paid are higher in stock financed deals (Beatty, San-
tomero & Smirlock, 1987; Shawky, Kilb & Staas, 1996; Hakes et al., 1997). 
On basis of previous literature, the following hypothesis is developed. 
Hypothesis: There exists a significant relationship between payment mode and deal prices. 
Since the acquisition prices not only depend on target firm characteristics, which based on its 
future value, but also on the acquirer firm's financial capacity. So, the present study considers the 
both i.e. characteristics of bidder and target firms. 
 
Data and Sample Selection 
Sample Selection 
The data about M&A deals is acquired from Competition Commission of Pakistan and Kara-
chi Stock Exchange. Initially there are 175 M&As deals (including nonfinancial, financial and non-
banking financial institutes) but the ultimate sample includes 104 events i.e. 56 in nonfinancial and 
48 in financial. Due to unavailability of complete set of data, the nonbanking financial segment is 
excluded. The remaining sample decrease due to inaccessibility of annual reports of the companies 
during required time period. So, the final sample includes the financial and nonfinancial sector 
M&As deals and a separate analysis is performed for both sectors.  
The sample selected meets the following criteria: 1) bidder firms are registered Pakistani 
firms2); events are during the time period of 2005-2012; 3) the sample includes complete deals and 
characterizes M&As of significant interest; 4) firms with single and several M&As are considered 
during the time period; 5) both the nonfinancial and financial sectors are included in the sample; 6) 
target companies are not essentially publicly registered; 7) the required data related to final sample 
is completely available. 
The data regarding ownership structure is available from shareholding section of acquirer 
company's annual reports before deal announcement. The financial constraints variables data is col-
lected from bidder firm's annual financial statements before the deal announcement. The deal 
amount data is obtained from data portal section of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) and from Mer-
ger & Acquisition section of Competition Commission of Pakistan. The next section explains the 
variables used in study. 
Data Analysis 
Dependent variables: Deal Values (D_V):  
The present study is conducted to analyze the deal price determinants in merger & acquisi-
tion deals. The dependent variable is defined as the natural log of deal prices paid in M&A. 
Independent variables: Bidder firm variables 
Institutional Share Holding (INST): 
Institutional investors’ presence in a company helps to raise long term funding at a reasona-
ble cost and serves as a monitoring device. Institutions presence on board decreases the agency costs 
in firm and also reduces executive opportunism. Institutional ownership is measured through the 
percentage of shares held by institutional owners as stated in pattern of shareholding section of an-
nual reports. 
External Block-holder (EBH): 
External block-holder is used as a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there exists 
an external block-holder (i.e. other than inside or managerial block holder) and 0 otherwise. The 
block-holder is an investor who holds more than 10 percent shares in a firm as stated in shareholding 
pattern section of annual reports. 
 
Yasmeen Akhtar, Tahir Yousaf, Qurat ul Ain, Attiya Yasmin Javid 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                                   58 
 
Cash Availability (C_R): 
Consistent with previous empirical literature, this variable is calculated as ratio of cash plus 
marketable securities to deal price at fiscal yearend before M&As deals. 
Growth Opportunities (M_B): 
The bidder firm growth opportunities are calculated through market to book ratio as a ratio 
of book value of debt plus market value of equity to total value of assets (book value) at fiscal yea-
rend before deal. 
Profitability; Return on Assets (ROA): 
In current study return on assets (ROA) is used to calculate profitability of firm and it is 
measured through ratio of net profit to value of firm's total assets at fiscal yearend before M&A 
deals. 
Firm Size (SIZE): 
Big companies usually have close relations with creditors and find it easy to raise debt on fa-
vorable terms. The evidence regarding the impact of firm size on deal prices is mixed. The firm size 
is measured by taking natural log of total assets at fiscal yearend before deal announcements.  
Cash Dummy (C_D):  
The percentage of cash or debt to finance the deals is used as independent variable. It is a bi-
nary variable which can take the value of 1 or 0. So this is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 for cash financed deals and zero in case of stock financed deals.  
Target Firm Characteristics: 
Target Relative Size (R_S): 
Prior empirical studies used target relative size to measure asymmetry of information. The 
target relative size is defined as ratio of deal value to acquirer market capitalization plus deal value 
before M&As deal announcement. 
Target Ownership Structure (TLS): 
Shareholders of unlisted target (private firm or an unregistered subsidiary of a public firm) 
may be reluctant to accept stock as a medium of payment due to liquidity reasons. Moreover, given 
the concentrated ownership of unlisted targets, bidding firm managers may not offer stock as a fi-
nancing medium because of the possibility of formation of a new block holder in the new firm re-
sulting from the merger. The target ownership structure is measured through dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if target firm is an impartial entity not registered on any stock exchange or an 
unregistered subsidiary and zero otherwise.  
 
Methodology 
The present study deals with deal amount determinants in merger and acquisition transac-
tions. The variables used as predictors (independent) are those which are derived from earlier studies 
related to premium and prices paid in mergers and acquisitions (Diaz & Azofra, 2009; Dionne, Haye 
& Bergeres, 2010; Alexandridis et al., 2013 etc.). The characteristics of both the acquirer and target 
institutes are used to analyze deal price determinants in M&A deals. The characteristics of acquirer 
firm include availability of cash, market-to-book ratio, firm size and its profitability and acquired 
firm features include its relative size and listing status. The dummy variable used to measure mode 
of financing (i.e. equal to 1 for cash financed deals and 0 otherwise) is also used as a deal amounts 
determinant in merger and acquisition transactions. The details of independent and dependent va-
riables have been given in data analysis part (i.e. third section). 
The model for deal amount for bidder firm is estimated suggested by (Diaz & Azofra, 2009; 
Dionne, Haye & Bergeres, 2010) as follows: 
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ܦ݈݁ܽ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ܫܰܵ ௜ܶ + ߚଶ  ܧܤܪ௜ + ߚଷܥ_ܴ௜ + ߚସܯ_ܤ௜ + ߚହܵܫܼܧ௜ + ߚ଺ܴܱܣ௜ + ߚ଻ܥ_ܦ௜
+ ݑ௜ 
The model for deal amount by including target firm’s characteristics is estimated suggested 
by (Diaz & Azofra, 2009; Dionne, Haye & Bergeres, 2010) as follows: 
݈݀݁ܽ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ܫܰܵ ௜ܶ + ߚଶ  ܧܤܪ௜ + ߚଷܥ_ܴ௜ + ߚସܯ_ܤ௜ + ߚହܵܫܼܧ௜ + ߚ଺ܴܱܣ௜ + ߚ଻ܥ_ܦ௜
+ ߚ଼ܴ_ ௜ܵ + +ߚଽܶܮ ௜ܵ + ݑ௜ 
The methodology of this study is novel as it takes into account the external governance me-
chanism by considering both the institutional ownership and external block holders along with other 
bidder and target firm characteristics. It also considers the impact of payment mode (whether cash or 
stock financed deals) on deal amounts to investigate the presence of financial synergies and over-
valuation hypothesis. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the determinants of deal amount 
for bidder and target firms and for test the significance of bidder and target firm's characteristics in 
analysis of deal price determinants. The white test is used to check the hetroskedasticity problem 
and hetro robust standard errors are reported in case of problem. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
The descriptive statistics analysis is reported in table 1 for both the financial and nonfinan-
cial segment. The statistics reported in analysis includes the mean, median and standard error for all 
variables used in study. These statistics reveal that assumption of normality does not hold i.e. distri-
bution is skewed as there are variations in values of mean and median. The z-test is used to test the 
significance of difference between means of all variables used in study of both sectors, as size of 
sample is bigger than 30 in both cases. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
 NONFINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SECTOR  
 MEAN ME-
DIAN 
STD. 
DEV 
MEAN ME-
DIAN 
STD. 
DEV 
Z-STAT 
C_D 0.6727 1 0.4735 0.75 1 0.4376 -0.8598 
EBH 0.8364 1 0.3734 0.9375 1 0.2446 -1.6628*** 
INST 0.1035 0.0619 0.1004 0.0691 0.0179 0.0939 1.7551*** 
C_R 10.51 0.7393 29.47 0.0762 0.0674 0.0235 2.6247* 
M_B 1.4267 1.0798 1.0123 0.8624 0.9884 0.4747 3.6979* 
ROA 0.0731 0.1062 0.6129 0.0012 0.014 0.1703 0.8360 
SIZE 16.17 16.18 1.4181 18.69 18.15 1.2986 -9.41* 
R_S 0.1495 0.0425 0.2035 0.0932 0.0123 0.1749 1.5134 
TLS 0.6545 1 0.4799 0.2292 0 0.4247 4.7679* 
D_V 12.57 12.43 1.9120 12.32 12.43 2.2384 0.6047 
Note: The *,**,*** represents level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The z-test of difference between means reveals that mean difference, i.e. difference between 
two sectors mean, is proved to be significant in most of cases except deal dummy, board size, ROA, 
relative size and deal amount. The average value of institutional owners is high in nonfinancial sec-
tor case as compared to financial and mean difference between two sectors is significant too. On the 
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other side, mean values of outside block holder (other than inside or managerial) and cash ratio are 
high in financial sector. The mean values of market-to-book ratio and non-listed target are high in 
case of nonfinancial sector. The descriptive analysis shows significant differences between nonfi-
nancial and financial segment deal price determinants, so a separate analysis is performed for both 
segments. The correlation matrix of variables used in study is inserted in the appendix, for both 
segments. 
 
Regression analysis 
Nonfinancial sector results 
The results of deal amount determinants in M&A transactions are placed in table 2 & 3 for 
both the financial and nonfinancial sector. The bidder’s institutional ownership is negatively related 
with deal prices, which shows that institutions are playing their monitoring role and prohibit the 
firm’s management to overpay in order to attain their personal benefits by increasing firm’s size in-
stead of value maximization. The outside block-holder is not shown to have significant role in M&A 
related decisions.  
The results show that the investment opportunities have a positive and cash ratio has a nega-
tive and significant relation with deal amounts in mergers and acquisitions. The findings regarding 
both variables show that there do not exist agency problems in nonfinancial segment, as agency con-
flicts also affect the acquisition deal prices. These types of conflicts arise when acquirer firm's man-
agement use their free cash flow to accept projects that produce insufficient profits for stockholders 
Jensen (1986). Another consequence of agency conflict is that acquirers categorized by big free cash 
flows and a low market-to-book ratio will use more hostile acquisition tactics and pay huge 
amounts, which leads to the notion that management decisions aid their own personal interests in-
stead firm's stockholders occasionally (Gondhalekar, Sant & Ferris, 2004). But the present study 
suggests the contradictory result, i.e. the decline in agency problems in nonfinancial segment, which 
might be the result of an increased insiders ownership (i.e. executives & directors) that align the in-
siders interests with those of  outside stockholders.  
Alternative argument which explains the relation between deal amount involved in M&As 
and bidder's cash availability (cash ratio) is that because of asymmetric information, that prevail in 
stock financed deals in form of bidder's overvalued stock, the target firms prefer the payments in 
cash form. Thus, the preference of target firms against stock financing lead them to receive low 
prices in merger &acquisition transactions. Also the direct relation between bidder's market-to-book 
ratio and deal amount leads to the conclusion that acquirers with high opportunities of growth are 
more expected to prefer stock financed deals. As the presence of asymmetric information is high in 
stock financed deals, hence the prices are higher in case of high growth bidders as compared to bid-
ders with low growth. 
The results also show a significant positive relationship of deal amounts with both the target 
relative size and size of bidder. This finding supports the view that bidders are paying high prices in 
M&A deals if it has a big size, financially sound and able to bring a more effective & value creating 
administration in order to improve the management and operations of target firm. Also the acquirer's 
size and target's relative size rationalize the higher payments for target, when purpose of acquisition 
is the achievement of bigger size not the value maximization (Diaz & Azofra, 2009).  
The significant negative relationship between profitability of firm and deal amounts reveals 
the existence of hubris. The amounts involved in M&A deals are also affected by acquirer's hubris 
that means the managers that exaggerate self-confidence attempt to overvalue their capability of 
managing the target, which justifies the higher payments for target firm (Roll, 1986; Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997). 
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The significant negative relationship between non listed target and deal amounts implies that 
bidder pay less to acquire unregistered targets, because the formation costs of unlisted targets are 
less than registered target entities, so bidder pay low in case of unlisted target firms. The finding is 
also in confirmation with Isa & Lee (2011) in sense that bidders purchasing public firms are striving 
for their personal interests like a surge in their prestige and power, thus they are ready to overpay for  
publicly registered targets than private firms. The mode of payment dummy (1 for cash fi-
nanced deals and 0 otherwise) is not proved to be significant in current analysis. 
 
 Table 2: Results of Bidder and Target Firm Model using OLS Estimation 
Variables Non-Financial Sector Financial Sector 
Coefficient t-stat p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value 
Intercept 0.0678 0.0316 0.9749 12.93 2.6199 0.0125* 
INST -2.7299 -1.7492 0.0869*** -6.1745 -2.0681 0.0453** 
EBH 0.1965 -0.3129 0.7558    
C_R -0.0072 -6.2518 0.0000* 15.352 1.1405 0.2611 
M_B 0.4940 2.2584 0.0287** -0.8040 -1.1806 0.2449 
ROA 2.9386 1.8637 0.0688*** 39.16 2.0456 0.0476** 
SIZE 0.7228 6.2429 0.0000* -0.0093 -0.0333 0.9736 
R_S 5.5032 3.6093 0.0008* 7.0990 4.0732 0.0002* 
TLS -0.9002 -2.9575 0.0049* 0.1346 0.1819 0.8566 
C_D 0.2906 0.9657 0.3392 -1.7505 -2.0137 0.0510** 
F-stat 15.04   8.24   
Pb(F-stat) 0.0000*   0.0000*   
DW-stat 2.11   1.28   
Adjusted 
R2 
0.70   0.55   
Note: The. *, **, *** represent significance level at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %. The errors are hetero adjusted standard robust 
errors. 
 
Non-Financial Sector: 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
F-statistic 132.6216 Probability 0.000117 
Obs*R-squared 55.96690 Probability 0.293829 
 
Financial Sector: 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
F-statistic 0.939671 Probability 0.529736 
Obs*R-squared 13.68115 Probability 0.473726 
 
Results of Financial sector deal amounts determinants 
The results of deal amount determinants in merger and acquisition transactions are presented 
in table 2 & 3 for financial sector. The bidder’s institutional ownership is negatively related with 
deal prices, which shows that institutions are playing their monitoring role and prohibit the firm’s 
management to overpay in order to attain their personal benefits by increasing firm’s size instead of 
value maximization. The outside block-holder is not proved to have significant role in M&A related 
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decisions. The results also show that C_R is positively and M_B ratio is negatively associated with 
deal amounts in merger and acquisition transactions. However, the results are not significant in both 
cases. 
 
Table 3: Results of Bidder Firm Model using OLS Estimation Technique 
Variables Non-Financial Sector Financial Sector 
Coefficient t-stat p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value 
Intercept 6.0243 2.42 0.019** 11.1069 2.10 0.042** 
INST -2.9365 -1.19 0.241 -8.099607 -2.21 0.033** 
EBH -0.6322 -0.72 0.477 .5217888 0.37 0.713 
C_R -0.0104 -8.08 0.000* 15.89533 1.19 0.242 
M_B 0.4815 2.81 0.007* -1.633867 -2.18 0.035** 
ROA 1.5628 0.78 0.442 16.79547 0.74 0.462 
 
 
SIZE 
0.9632 
2.57 0.013* 
.5376861 
0.78 0.438 
C_D -0.0936 -0.20 0.840 -3.919775 -5.03 0.000* 
F-stat 5.9101   5.028   
Pb(F-stat) 0.0000*   0.0004*   
DW-stat 2.11   1.05   
Adjusted 
R2 
0.38   0.37   
Note: The. *, **, *** represent significance level at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %. The errors are hetero adjusted standard robust 
errors. 
 
The results also show a positive relation of deal amounts with both the target relative size 
and size of bidder, however the result is significant only in target's relative size case. This finding 
supports the view that bidders are paying high prices in M&A deals, when purpose of acquisition is 
the achievement of bigger size not the value maximization (Diaz & Azofra, 2009). This objective, 
titled as “too big to fail”, has been one of the key motives of most banking sector mergers in Anglo 
Saxon literature in 1990sand it defends the payment of high prices for mega mergers and mergers 
between comparable firms. The desire to grow aggressively intended that more profitable and larger 
institutes are willing to pay huge amounts in M&A deals (Kane, 2000; Hakes, Brown and Rappa-
port, 1997). 
The significant negative relationship between profitability of bidder firm and deal amounts 
reveals the existence of hubris. The amounts involved in M&A deals are also effected by acquirer's 
hubris that means the managers that exaggerate self-confidence attempt to overvalue their capability 
of managing the target, which justifies the higher payments for target firm (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997). Our findings support this hypothesis in financial sector case too. 
The results show a negative and significant relation between the C_D and the deal amount, 
which states that cash financed deals are linked with low acquisition prices. The significance of 
payment means (cash or stock) could be explained conferring to following hypothesis: overvaluation 
hypothesis and financial synergies. Firstly, the relation between the payment form and premium can 
be described according to overvaluation hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984). This hypothesis 
depends on the presence of information asymmetry about the firm, as management of firm have 
more info than the rest of parties. Executives of bidding institute will prefer stock financed deals if 
they think their stock to be overvalued. Since the stock financed deals would be taken as a negative 
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signal by market, which aware about asymmetric information, therefore the value of bidder' shares 
would decline. So the premium in stock financed deals should be higher than cash financed deals. 
According to financial synergy hypothesis, stock financed deals can offer greater financial synergies 
than cash financed deals, as the later indicates liquidity constraints. In this logic, prices paid are 
higher in stock financed deals (Beatty, Santomero & Smirlock, 1987; Shawky, Kilb & Staas, 
1996;Hakes et al., 1997). 
 
Table 4: Nonfinancial Sector Correlation Matrix 
 C_D EBH INST C_R M_B ROA SIZE R_S TLS D_V 
C_D 1 -0.20 0.32 0.18 -0.13 -0.19 0.22 -0.11 0.31 -0.03
EBH -0.20 1 -0.05 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.05 -0.21 -0.22 -0.08
INST 0.32 -0.05 1 -0.17 -0.27 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.19
C_R 0.18 0.13 -0.17 1 -0.03 -0.06 0.34 -0.25 0.21 -0.22
M_B -0.13 0.11 -0.27 -0.03 1 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.33
ROA -0.19 -0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 1 -0.04 0.19 -0.18 0.10
SIZE 0.22 0.05 0.01 0.34 0.06 -0.04 1 -0.42 0.22 0.30
R_S -0.11 -0.21 -0.06 -0.25 -0.02 0.19 -0.42 1 -0.31 0.42
TLS 0.31 -0.22 -0.03 0.21 0.09 -0.18 0.22 -0.31 1 -0.24
D_V -0.03 -0.08 -0.19 -0.23 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.43 -0.24 1
 
Table 5: Financial Sector Correlation Matrix 
 C_D EBH INST C_R M_B ROA SIZE R_S TLS D_V 
C_D 1 0.25 0.02 0.15 -0.43 0.25 0.34 -0.59 0.31 -0.37
EBH 0.25 1 0.07 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.14 -0.09
INST 0.02 0.07 1 0.25 0.19 0.11 0.24 -0.13 -0.24 -0.12
C_R 0.15 0.09 0.25 1 0.40 0.45 0.44 -0.30 0.46 -0.05
M_B -0.43 0.05 0.19 0.40 1 -0.01 0.28 0.01 0.14 0.07
ROA 0.25 -0.01 0.11 0.45 -0.01 1 0.61 -0.36 0.31 0.06
SIZE 0.34 0.09 0.24 0.44 0.28 0.61 1 -0.32 0.45 0.04
R_S -0.59 0.03 -0.13 -0.30 0.01 -0.36 -0.32 1 -0.17 0.66
TLS 0.31 0.14 -0.24 0.46 0.14 0.31 0.45 -0.17 1 -0.03
D_V -0.37 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.66 -0.03 1
 
Conclusion 
The studies regarding the amounts paid in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) deals become 
especially important, as reduction of proceeds in such deals might be due to large amounts paid in 
the acquisitions, which might put the stability and soundness of institutions at risk. However in case 
of Pakistan, the studies related to M&As have generally emphasized the financial segment and ana-
lyzed pre and post acquisitions performance. As per the available literature, this is the first study that 
explored the effect of target and acquirer firm's features on deal amounts paid in M&A in Pakistan. 
So, the current study adds to previous academic research by considering the joint association of 
ownership structure, financial constraints, growth prospects, asymmetric information and the choice 
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of financing mode on deal amounts in corporate sector M&As in Pakistan. The sample consists of 
events during 2005-12 and includes 104 events (56 in nonfinancial and 48 in financial sector). 
The findings of study reveals that acquirer’s institutions are playing their monitoring role and 
prohibit the firm’s management to overpay in order to attain their personal benefits in both sectors. 
The outside block-holder is not proved to have significant role in M&A related decisions. The non-
financial sector proves the absence of agency conflicts in case of nonfinancial sector, however fi-
nancial sector don’t proves the significance of agency hypothesis. The results of both sector also 
shows that mergers are done with aim of achievement of big size instead of value maximization. The 
amounts involved in M&A deals are also affected by acquirer's hubris that means the managers that 
exaggerate self-confidence attempt to overvalue their capability of managing the target, which justi-
fies the higher payments for target firm (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Our findings support this 
hypothesis in financial sector case too. 
The financial sector result shows that cash financed deals are associated with lower price and 
it can be described according to overvaluation hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984). This hypo-
thesis depends on the presence of information asymmetry about the firm, as management of firm 
have more info than the rest of parties. Executives of bidding institute will prefer stock financed 
deals if they think their stock to be overvalued. Since the stock financed deals would be taken as a 
negative signal by market, which aware about asymmetric information, therefore the value of bidder' 
shares would decline. So the premium in stock financed deals should be higher than cash financed 
deals. 
The present study results may guide corporate practitioners to avoid the deals that lead to-
wards unsatisfactory post M&As performance. Some of the reasons behind poor post M&A perfor-
mance include that managers may pursue acquisition deals to diversify their unemployment risk (i.e. 
by leveling firm's profits), and not necessarily for shareholders' interests. On the other hand, these 
deals may be done to achieve big size. It would permit management to take incentives like increased 
recompense and prestige in post M&As era. 
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